HK Government plays God in residential market – 8 questions and 8 answers
The Government will amend the Stamp Duty Ordinance (the Ordinance) to adjust the duty rates and extend the coverage period in respect of the existing Special Stamp Duty (SSD), and introduce a Buyer’s Stamp Duty (BSD) on residential properties acquired by any person except a Hong Kong Permanent Resident (HKPR).
The adjusted SSD will have three levels of regressive rates for different holding periods –
(i) 20 per cent if the property has been held for six months or less;
(ii) 15 per cent if the property has been held for more than six months but for 12 months or less; and
(iii) 10 per cent if the property has been held for more than 12 months but for 36 months or less.
The BSD will be charged at a flat rate of 15 per cent for all residential properties, on top of the existing stamp duty and SSD, if applicable, acquired by any person or entity, except a HKPR. Exemptions will be provided to certain transactions including, for example, those involving a HKPR and his or her close relatives who are not HKPR.
Table 1: summary of changes in new stamp duties on residential property
| Before | After | Change | |
| SSD – reselling: | |||
| Within 6 months | 15% | 20% | 5ppts |
| In 6-12 months | 10% | 15% | 5ppts |
| In 12-24 months | 5% | 10% | 5ppts |
| In 24-36 months | 0% | 10% | 10ppts |
| BSD | n/a | 15% | Only HK permanent ID holders buying in personal names exempted |
Source: http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/faq/index.htm
We address this new policy in a series of Q&As: 1) Will speculator fleeing cause prices to tank? 2) Can you quantify how many foreign home buyers/investors are affected? 3) How will local end user reaction affect the housing market? 4) What will happen to developers and their pipelines and profits? 5) Will this lead to lower government land sales? 6) Which property segment benefit from this new policy? 7) Will the govt come after my hard earned cash wherever I go 8) What are your price expectations going forward?
Q: Will the SSD/BSD cause speculators to flee? A: “Speculators? What speculators?” is our response. In 2012 YTD, the proportion of residential confirmor sales reached new record low of 0.1% (see Chart 1), a fraction of the 1.8% before the SSD were introduced in October 2010, and much lower than peak speculative years such as 7.1% in 1997. In other words, speculators playing residential property is now an immaterial and miniscule part of the market already, action by this class of players would therefore be next to NIL.
Chart 1: Speculator activity are at record lows in HK
Source: Centaline
Separately according to Centaline data, the proportion of sellers who hold less than six months have fallen from 14% in 1997 to 3.3% in 2011, and then to a new low of 0.2% in 2012 YTD. Even those holding for two years before selling have also come down from 28% of transactions to 22% in 2011, and halving again to 11% in 2012 YTD (Chart 2). It may well be that a good proportion of the 0.2% sellers disposing within six months this year are people who have come into hardship and needed to realise their homes for cash, only to be hit twice by the government’s SSD measures. Ouch!
Chart 2: Proportion of ‘speculators’ probably vastly outnumbered by ‘hard-up sellers’
Source: Centaline
Q: Can you quantify how many foreign buyers/investors are affected? A: PRC buyers make up the bulk of non-local buyers in Hong Kong, making up some 33% of luxury, 31% of new flats, and a much more moderate 7.4% of existing residential units (Chart 3).
Chart 3: PRC buyers as proportion of all residential transactions
Source: Centaline
Beside PRC nationals, the combined population of Whites/Indians/Japanese (i.e. the majority of non-domestic help population) make up a mere 1.4% of HK population, with those who have been resident in HK for <7 years an even lower 0.7%. These other nationalities are therefore unlikely to be meaningfully significant in their reduction in buying power in the overall residential market.
The unfair component of the new policy lies in the aspect that professionals living and working in Hong Kong – who are contributing taxes and building the city’s future – are denied the ability to buy their own homes without being hit by the 15% BSD, until they become permanent residents. How do we attract talent to the city when they are not given the chance to own their own homes?
Q: How will local end user reaction affect the housing market? A: First, local end-users – the segment the government is keen to help – will see further drop in available units on the market, as the policy deters upgraders from moving, in fear that they may be tied down to a new purchase which may be near the top of the market, which if sold before the market turned south three years from now, will be whacked with a punitive tax.
Second, the lack of available offerings on the market caused by the absence of investor participation and upgrader selling means end-users will take even longer to find their homes.
Third, as sellers holding for less than three years fall away under the new policy, this segment, estimated at 20% of total transaction volumes, will be delayed or cancelled – HK residential property market will go from the world’s most dynamic and liquid market to a genuine ‘immovable asset’ market.
Fourth, with the 10% or so buying demand from corporates now disappearing (done under corporate ownership in order to provide staff accommodation or to shield buyer identity) as well as the 15-25ppts delayed local buying adding to the purging of non-local demand, we could be looking at as much as 30-40% drop in market volumes (Table 2). Table 2: Estimated drop in secondary market residential transactions
| Private residential market | Pre-policy transactions* | Proportional drop | Likely post-policy transactions* | |||
| Min | Max | Min | Max | Min | Max | |
| PRC buyers | 10% | 15% | -80% | -67% | 2% | 5% |
| owners who sell <3 yrs | 20% | 40% | -75% | -63% | 5% | 15% |
| company buyers | 10% | 10% | -80% | -50% | 2% | 5% |
| speculators | 0.2% | 2% | -100% | -50% | 0% | 1% |
| ‘genuine users’ | 60% | 33% | 0% | 0% | 60% | 33% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | -31% | -41% | 69% | 59% |
| * transaction = demand |
Source: B&MM
Q: What will happen to developers and their pipelines and profits? A: As shown in Chart 3 above, PRC buyers make up as much as 30% of primary residential demand, compounding this sizable chunk with withdrawals from corporate and local buyer demand, developers collectively could see 40-50% drop in buying dollar for their projects (this may be 40-50% fewer buyers at the current prices, or 40-50% cut in prices for the same number of buyers, or any combination in between).
Given that the total primary market transactions in the past 18 months (pre-policy) ran at HK$12bn/month or HK$144bn/year, this is equivalent to an annual drop in sales revenue of HK$58-72bn. With profit margins of 30-40%, this translates to HK$17-29bn of lost profits each year for the developers as a whole. And on total market cap for the top eight developers of HK$970bn, two years of lost profit would equate to 3.5-6% of share price losses for the sector.
In other words, the share price drops of Monday (29 October) already largely discount the prospect of this measure being in force for just over two years, if our estimates above fall on the mark.
Q: Will this lead to lower government land sales? A: Given the likely fall in sales revenue of up to 50% in the next two years or more, it is likely that developers will be scaling back materially their bids in any upcoming government land sales.
Chances are, relevant officials will not re-adjust their reserve price expectations until sufficient hard evidence has emerged that the market price for land has softened. The likely outcome therefore will be more than one site being retracted from sale for failing to ‘attract the bottom price’.
This brings forward the biggest problem characterized by the infrastructural setup of the government – on the one hand to maximise land sale revenue, and on the other hand to clamp down on home prices. We have long argued that when in conflict, the need to provide sufficient supply for the Hong Kong economy (i.e. when necessary, sell land cheap and sell them plenty) should trump the revenue considerations of the Treasury to earn high land revenues.
Q: Which property segments benefit from this new policy? A: What we have is a global currency depreciation war. All assets will rise relative to paper money, and Hong Kong residential property, despite having these transaction barriers erected, will be under little risk of a big fall. However, with the biggest fire exit blocked, the people in the theatre will all be heading for the alternative exits.
Chart 4: If half of residential buying power (1/2 x 71% = 36%) goes to non-residential (26%)…
Source: Centaline, B&MM
As Chart 4 above shows, even if half of the pre-policy residential demand (35% of total transaction value) goes into the combined shop-office-industrial segment (26%), the newly arriving liquidity will more than swamp existing demand by 1.4 to 1. This is very bullish for the industrial and office sectors, which are our favoured investment subsectors in Hong Kong.
Q: Will the govt come after my hard earned cash wherever I go? A: Such demand distortions are exactly the reason why government interventions should be kept to a minimum – the more the visible hand meddles in asset markets, the more bubbles it creates, and the more irresponsible behavior it encourages which eventually leads to systemic inefficiencies, if not crises.
The problem is, will the bubbles thus caused by the government lead to further irrational exuberance on the part of the people in power – in the pursuit of formless and fast flowing liquidity, will the government feel so omnipotent to hunt down non-residential property sector, and when money inevitably seeks shelter in the high risk stock market, clamp down on that too? What about the bond market, the IOU fiat scheme where supply is equally limitless? Where does the government’s moral obligation to ‘steady prices’ end and where a full blown communist style planned economy and total price controls start?
The government needs to think about the moral hazards of driving citizen’s hard earned savings from predictable hard asset markets into often majority controlled security markets where leverages are high, supplies are unlimited (read: minority protection is impossible), and where losses of fortunes can be instant and severe political repercussions can be equally swift (remember the Accumulator saga anyone?).
Q: What are your price expectations going forward? A: Residential prices may correct initially by 5% or so, followed by gradual recovery in 2013 back towards our target of 116 on the Centa-City Leading Index (CCL Index). We do not expect a big correction due to the fact that this new policy adds friction to new owners of residential property (which even falls to nil if held by local permanent residents who hold for three years) but does not fundamentally alter the intrinsic economics of property ownership – the fact that rental yields are well above deposit rates (Chart 5), and also in excess of market mortgage rates, in an environment of rising rents.
Chart 5: Mass housing yield gap still points to price appreciation
Source: HKMA, RVD, B&MM
As to rents, there may be more upward pressure as increasing numbers of potential buyers turn into renters. The combined rise in rents and small correction in prices should make housing yield more attractive providing support to prices.
Hong Kong residential property under the new policy will have no speculators, few short term investors, only strong holders who could pay a large downpayment, have high income visibility, and generally good holding power. With such a body of owners, price volatility will increasingly trend towards long term nominal GDP growth of 6-8% p.a. In other words, HK residential may become a TIPS like bond for as long as the current suite of policies stay in place.
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